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ABSTRACT
We provide methods to prevent line failures in the power grid
caused by a newly revealed MAnipulation of Demand (MAD) at-
tacks via an IoT botnet of high-wattage devices. In particular, we
develop two algorithms named Securing Additional margin For
generators in Economic dispatch (SAFE) Algorithm and Iteratively
MiniMize and boUNd Economic dispatch (IMMUNE) Algorithm for
finding robust operating points for generators during the economic
dispatch such that no lines are overloaded after automatic primary
control response to any MAD attacks. In situations that the operat-
ing cost of the grid in a robust state is costly (or no robust operating
points exist), we provide efficient methods to verify–in advance–if
possible line overloads can be cleared during the secondary control
after any MAD attacks. We then define the αD-robustness notion
for the grids indicating that any line failures can be cleared during
the secondary control if an adversary can increase/decrease the
demands by α fraction. We demonstrate that practical upper and
lower bounds on the maximum α for which the grid is αD-robust
can be found efficiently in polynomial time. Finally, we evaluate
the performance of the developed algorithms and methods on real-
istic power grid test cases. Our work provides the first methods for
protecting the grid against potential line failures caused by MAD
attacks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Power grid, as one of the most essential infrastructure networks,
has been repeatedly evinced in the past couple of years to be vulner-
able to cyber attacks. The most infamous example of these attacks
was on Ukrainian grid that affected about 225,000 people in De-
cember 2015 [29]. However, smaller scale attacks on reginal power
grids have been shown in a recent report to be more common and
pervasive [27]. As indicated in the report, “Hackers are developing
a penchant for attacks on energy infrastructure because of the impact
the sector has on people’s lives" [27].
Because of this ever-growing threat, there has been a significant
effort by researchers in recent years to protect the grid against
cyber attacks. These efforts has been mainly focused on potential
attacks that directly affect different components of power grids’
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Many
system operators prefer to completely disconnect their SCADA
systems from the Internet in the hope that their systems remain
unreachable to hackers.
Despite these efforts, the power demand side of the grid operation
which is not controlled by SCADA, has been justifiably neglected
in security assessments due to their predictable nature. However, as
recently revealed by Soltan et al. [31] and Dabrowski et al. [9], the
universality and growth in the number of high-wattage Internet
of Things (IoT) devices, such as air conditioners and water heaters,
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Figure 1: The MAD attack. An adversary with access to an
IoT botnet of high-wattage devices can remotely and syn-
chronously switch on/off these devices in order to change
power flows on the lines in power grid transmission net-
work and cause line overloads and failures.
have provided a unique way for adversaries to disrupt the normal op-
eration of power grid, without any access to the SCADA system. In par-
ticular, an adversary with access to sufficiently many of such high-
wattage devices (i.e, a botnet), can abruptly increase or decrease
the total demand in the system by synchronously turning these
devices on or off, respectively. We call these attacks MAnipulation
of Demand (MAD) attacks (see Fig. 1).
An abrupt increase/decrease in the total demand, results in
abrupt drop/rise in the system’s frequency. If this drop/rise is
significant, generators will be automatically disconnected from
the grid and a large scale blackout occurs within seconds [9, 31].
If the drop/rise in the frequency is not significant, the extra de-
mand/generation can automatically be compensated by generators’
primary controllers, and the frequency of the system will be sta-
bilized. As a result of this automatic change in generation–and
demand by the adversary–the power flows in the transmission net-
work change based on power flow equations. Since the power flows
are not controlled by the grid operator at this stage, this change
in the power flows may result in line overloads and consequent
line-trippings. These initial line failures can initiate a cascading
line failure and result in a large scale black out in the grid [31].
The grid operator can protect the grid against initial drop/rise in
the system’s frequency caused by a MAD attack by ensuring that
the system have enough inertia (mostly through rotating genera-
tors) and there is enough available spinning reserve (i.e., generators
have enough extra generation capacity) [31]. However, protecting
the grid against possible line overloads and failures after a MAD
attack, which is the main focus of this paper, is more analytically
and computationally challenging. Such defences require the grid op-
erator to analyze all possible MAD attacks and their consequences
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on the power flows and select operating points for the generators
such that no lines are overloaded after any MAD attacks.
We first focus on finding operating points (namely robust oper-
ating points) with the minimum cost for the generators such that
no lines are overloaded after the automatic primary response of
the generators to any MAD attacks. Since changes in power flows
after a MAD attack directly depend on generators’ operating points,
finding the optimal operating points for the generators requires
solving a nonconvex and nonlinear optimization problem which is
hard in general. Despite this hardness, we develop two algorithms
named Securing Additional margin For generators in Economic
dispatch (SAFE) Algorithm and Iteratively MiniMize and boUNd
Economic dispatch (IMMUNE) Algorithm for finding suboptimal
yet robust operating points for the generators efficiently. The SAFE
Algorithm provides robust operating points for the generators by
solving a single Linear Program (LP). The IMMUNE Algorithm on
the other hand requires a few iterations until it converges, but it
provides robust operating points with lower costs than the ones
obtained by the SAFE Algorithm.
In situations that the operating cost of the grid in a robust state
is costly (or no robust operating points exist due to lack of enough
resources), the grid operator may decide to allow temporary line
overloads–by increasing thresholds on circuit breakers–in the case
of a MAD attack, and clear the overloads during the secondary
control. During the secondary control, which comes right after the
automatic primary control, the grid operator can directly change
generators’ operating points in order to bring back the system’s fre-
quency to its nominal value and clear any line overloads. To make
sure that line overloads can be cleared during the secondary control,
the grid operator needs to verify in advance whether for any po-
tential MAD attack, there exist operating points for the generators
satisfying demands such that no lines are overloaded (namely, the
grid is secondary controllable). However, due to the extent of the
attack space, checking all possible attack scenarios is numerically
impossible. Hence, we develop several predetermined control po-
lices that can be used to verify the secondary controllability of the
grid in most scenarios with no false positives.
Based on the secondary controllability notion, we then evaluate
the robustness of a grid against MAD attacks. A magnitude of a
MAD attack is defined based on the size of an adversary’s botnet.
If these bots are distributed proportionally to the demand sizes
across a region, then the magnitude of an attack can be denoted by
α fraction of demand that the adversary can increase or decrease at
each location. We call a grid that is secondary controllable against
any MAD attacks that change at most α fraction of demands, αD-
robust. In general, finding maximum α such that a given grid is
αD-robust, is hard. However, based on developed predetermined
control policies, we provide efficient methods to compute practical
upper and lower bounds for the maximum α .
Finally, we numerically evaluate the performance of the devel-
oped algorithms and controllers. For example, in New England
39-bus system, we show that the SAFE and IMMUNE Algorithms
find operating points for the generators with at most 6 and 2 per-
cent increase in the total operating cost such that the grid is robust
against MAD attacks of magnitude α = 0.08. We also evaluate
the performance of the developed methods for approximating the
maximum α that grid is αD-robust and show that for example in
New England 39-bus system, the provided lower and upper bounds
are tight and are equal to the maximum αmax = 0.0962.
To the best of knowledge, our work is the first to study the effects of
potential MAD attacks via high-wattage IoT devices on the power flows
in the grid and provide efficient preventive algorithms to avoid line
failures after primary control response, and also efficient methods to
verify if the line overloads can be cleared during the secondary control.
These algorithms and methods can be adopted by grid operators to
protect their systems against MAD attacks now and in the near future.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides
related work and Section 3 presents a brief introduction to power
system’s operation and control. In Section 4, we introduce the MAD
attacks and provide their basic properties. In Section 5, we present
the SAFE and IMMUNE algorithms and in Section 6, we provide
efficient methods for verifying secondary controllability of a grid.
Section 7 provides methods to evaluate robustness of grids against
MAD attacks and Section 8 presents numerical results. Finally,
Section 9 provides concluding remarks and future directions. Due
to space constraints, some proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 RELATEDWORK
Power systems’ vulnerability to failures and attacks has been widely
studied in the past few years [5, 7, 8, 12, 30]. In a recent work [17],
Garcia et al. introduced Harvey malware that affects power grid
control systems and can execute malicious commands. Theoretical
methods for detecting cyber attacks on power grids and recovering
information after such attacks have also been developed [6, 10, 11,
22–25, 32, 34]. However, most of the previous work have focused on
attacks that directly target the power grid’s physical infrastructure
or its control system.
Load altering attacks on smart meters and large cloud servers
has been first introduced by Mohsenian et al. [28]. Their work
was mostly focused on the cost of protecting the grid against such
attacks at loads. Amini et al. [1] have also recently studied the effects
of load altering attacks on the dynamics of the system and ways
to use the system’s frequency as feed-back to improve an attack.
In three very recent papers, Dvorkin and Sang [13], Dabrowski et
al. [9], and Soltan et al. [31] revealed the possibility of exploiting
compromised IoT devices to manipulate the demands and to disrupt
normal operation of the power grid. Dvorkin and Sang [13] modeled
their attack as an optimization problem for the adversary–with
complete knowledge of the grid–to cause circuit breakers to trip
in the distribution network. Dabrowski et al. [9] studied the effect
of demand increases caused by remote activation of CPUs, GPUs,
hard disks, screen brightness, and printers on the frequency of
the European power grid. Soltan et al. [31] analyzed the effects
of sudden increase and decrease in the demand via an IoT botnet
of high-wattage devices from different operational perspectives
and demonstrated that besides frequency instability, such attacks
can also result in wide spread cascading line failures. To the best of
our knowledge, however, the work presented in this paper is the first
to provide practical defences against possible line failures caused by
attacks that target the demand side of power grids.
2
3 MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we provide a brief introduction to power systems’
operation and control. Our focus is on power transmission network.
Throughout this paper we use bold uppercase characters to de-
note matrices (e.g., A), italic uppercase characters to denote sets
(e.g., V ), and italic lowercase characters and overline arrow to de-
note column vectors (e.g., ®θ ). For a matrix Q, Qi denotes its ith row,
qi j denotes its (i, j)th entry, and QT denotes its transpose. For a
column vector ®y, ®yT denotes its transpose, and ∥ ®y∥1 := ∑ni=1 |yi |
is its l1-norm. For a variable x , sgn(x) denotes its sign, and x and
x denote its upper and lower limits, respectively. For a vector ®y,
for simplicity of notation, we drop the vector sign ® in denoting
vectors of upper and lower limits on the entries of ®y as y and y,
respectively. Finally, ®e1, . . . , ®en denote the fundamental basis of Rn
and ®1 = ∑ni=1 ®ei denotes the all ones vector.
3.1 Power Flows
Power flows are governed by a set of differential equations. In
the steady-state, using phasors, these differential equations can be
reduced to a set of algebraic equations on complex numbers known
as Alternating Current (AC) power flow model. Due to nonlinearity
of AC power flow equations and the computational complexity of
solving these equations, in practice and in day-ahead power grid
contingency analysis and planning, the linearized version of these
equations known as Direct Current (DC) power flowmodel is widely
being used [33]. Hence, in this work, for simplicity of presentation,
we also adapt the DC power flow model for our analysis. However,
the main idea of the algorithms developed in this work can be
extended to the AC power flow models as well.
We represent the power grid by a connected directed graph
G = (V ,E) where V = {1, 2, . . . ,n} and E = {e1, . . . , em } are the
set of nodes and edges corresponding to the buses and transmission
lines, respectively (the definition implies |V | = n and |E | =m). Each
edge e is a set of two nodes e = (i, j). (Direction of the edges are
arbitrary.) ®pd ≥ 0 and ®pд ≥ 0 denote the vector of power demand
and supply values, respectively. Accordingly, ®p = ®pд − ®pd denotes
the vector of total supply and demand values. Since sum of supply
should be equal to sum of demand,
®1T ®p = 0, (1)
in which ®1 is an all ones vector. In the DC model, lines are also
assumed to be purely reactive, implying that each edge e = (i, j) ∈ E
is characterized by its reactance xe = xi j > 0.
Given the power supply/demand vector ®p ∈ Rn×1 and the reac-
tance values, the vector of power flows on the lines ®f ∈ Rm×1 can
be computed by solving following linear equations:
A®θ = ®p, (2)
YDT ®θ = ®f , (3)
where ®θ ∈ Rn×1 is the vector of voltage phase angles at nodes,
D ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×m is the incidence matrix of G defined as,
dik =

0 if ek is not incident to node i,
1 if ek is coming out of node i,
−1 if ek is going into node i,
Y := diag([1/xe1 , 1/xe2 , . . . , 1/xem ]) is a diagonal matrix with di-
agonal entries equal to the inverse of the reactance values, and
A = DYDT is the admittance matrix of G.1
Since A is not a full-rank matrix, we follow [30] and use the
pseudo-inverse of A, denoted by A+ to solve (2) as ®θ = A+ ®p. Once
®θ is computed, ®f can be computed from (3) as ®f = YDTA+ ®p. For
convenience of notation, we define B := YDTA+. Hence, ®f = B®p.
3.2 Power Grid Operation
Stable operation of the power grid relies on the persistent balance
between the power supply and demand. In order to keep the balance
between the power supply and the demand, power system operators
use weather data as well as historical power consumption data to
predict the power demand on a daily and hourly basis [16]. This
allows the system operators to plan in advance and only deploy
enough generators to meet the demand in the hours ahead without
overloading any power lines. This planning ahead consists of two
parts: unit commitment and economic dispatch.
In unit commitment which is mainly performed daily, the grid
operator selects a set of generators to commit their availability dur-
ing the day-ahead operation of the grid. But the actual operating
points of the generators (i.e., generation outputs) are determined by
the operator during the day and in the process known as economic
dispatch. The main goal of operator during economic dispatch is to
ensure reliable operation of the grid with minimum power gener-
ation cost. When feasibility of the power flows is also considered
during economic dispatch, the process is also known as Optimal
Power Flow (OPF) problem. Since in practice feasibility of power
flows is always being considered, these two terms can be used
interchangeably most of the times.
In this work, we mainly focus on ensuring robustness of the
grid during the economic dispatch. Extending our methods to unit
commitment process is beyond the scope of this paper and is part
of the future work. Hence, here we assume that set of available
generators are given. The main challenge is to obtain a favorable
operating point for these generators.
3.2.1 Optimal Power Flow. In the OPF problem, given the vector
of predicted demand values ®pd , the grid operator needs to find
the operating point vector ®pд for the generators such that supply
matches the demand (i.e., ®1T ( ®pд − ®pd ) = 0), the operating and
physical constraints are satisfied, and the operating cost of the
generators are minimized.
In particular, each line fi j has a thermal power flow limit fi j
limiting the amount of power that a line can safely carries. If the
power flow on a line goes above this limit (i.e., overloads), in most of
the cases, it will be tripped by a circuit breaker in order to keep the
line from breaking due to overheating. Hence, during the normal
operation of the grid
| fi j | ≤ fi j , ∀(i, j) ∈ E. (4)
The amount of power that each generator pдi is generating is also
limited by a maximum (pдi ) and a minimum (pдi ) value. If there
1The admittance matrix A is also known as the weighted Laplacian matrix of the
graph [2] in graph theory.
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are no generators at node i , then pдi = pдi = 0. Hence,
pд ≤ ®pд ≤ pд . (5)
The generation cost at each generator is a given by a cost function
ci (x) in $/hr . Given these cost functions, the OPF problem can be
formulated as follows:
min
®θ, ®f , ®pд
n∑
l=1
cl (pдi ), (6)
s.t. (1), (2), (3), (4), (5),
®p = ®pд − ®pd .
Several methods for optimally solving (6) depending on the cost
functions exist in literature [33]. Hence, we assume that (6) can be
solved either optimally or approximately using existing methods.
3.3 Frequency control
In power systems, the rotating speed of generators correspond to
the frequency. When demand becomes greater than supply, the
rotating speeds of turbine generators’ rotors decelerate, and the
kinetic energy of the rotors are released into the system in response
to the extra demand. Correspondingly, this causes a drop in the sys-
tem’s frequency. This behavior of turbine generators corresponds
to Newton’s first law of motion and is calculated by the inertia of
the generators. Similarly, the supply being greater than the demand
results in acceleration of the generators’ rotors and a rise in the
system’s frequency.
This decrease/increase in the frequency of the system cannot be
tolerated for a long time since frequencies lower than their nominal
value severely damage the generators. If the frequency goes above
or below a threshold value, protection relays turn off or disconnect
the generators completely. Hence, in case of a demand increase,
within seconds of the first signs of decrease in the frequency, the pri-
mary controllers at generators activate and increase the mechanical
input to the generators which increase the speed of the generator’s
rotor and correspondingly the generator’s output and frequency
of the system [14]. The rate of decrease/increase in frequency of
the system, before activation of the primary controllers, directly
depends on the total inertia of the system. Systems with higher
number of rotating generators have higher inertia and therefore are
more robust against sudden demand changes or generation losses.
The rate of increase in the output generation of generator i
during the primary control is determined by its governor droop
characteristic denoted by Ri [26, Chapter 9]. Hence, after a change
in the total demand by S∆pd , primary controller of each generator i
increases its output with rate Ri until the total generation is equal to
the demand again. In particular, if none of the generators reach their
generation limit, each generator i will increase its generation by
S∆pd /Ri . The amount of power that generators can provide during
the primary control is called the spinning reserve of the generators.
Despite stability of the system’s frequency after the primary
controllers’ response, it may not return to its nominal value (since
generators generatingmore than their generating set points). Hence,
the secondary controller starts withinminutes to restore the system’s
frequency. The secondary controller modifies the power set points
and deploys available extra generators and controllable demands
to restore the nominal frequency and permanently stabilizes the
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Figure 2: A sample frequency response of the power grid to
a sudden increase in the demand (or loss of generation).
system.2 Fig. 2 presents an example of the way frequency of the
system changes after a sudden increase in the demand (or loss of
generation) at time 0.
4 MAD ATTACKS
We assume that an adversary has already gained access to an IoT
botnet of many high-wattage smart appliances within a city, a coun-
try, or a continent. Such access can potentially allow the adversary
to increase or decrease the demand at different locations remotely
and synchronously at a certain time. We call the attacks under this
threat model the MAnipulation of the Demand (MAD) attacks.
The adversary’s power tomanipulate the demand can bemodeled
by the maximum and minimum demand changes that it can make at
each node. In particular, we assume the demand changes at node l
by an adversary are bounded by −∆pdl ≤ ∆pdl ≤ ∆pdl . Notice that
from defensive point of view, there are no differences between an
adversary with the total knowledge of the system (a.k.a white-box
attacks) and an adversary with no knowledge of the system (a.k.a
black-box attacks), since the operator needs to make sure that the
grid is robust against any possible attacks.
The initial effect of a MAD attack, as described in Section 3.3 is
on the frequency of the system. However, the system operator can
make the system robust against frequency disturbances caused by
MAD attacks by ensuring that enough generators with inertia and
spinning reserve are committed to operate during the unit com-
mitment process [31]. The minimum required inertia and spinning
reserve should be computed based on the potential attack size and
the properties of the grid. Devices that provide virtual inertia such
as batteries, super-capacitors, and flywheels can also be integrated
into the system to increase the total inertia [21].
Hence, the main challenge in protecting the grid against initial
effects of MAD attacks is in the hardware level. However, the ef-
fects of MAD attacks are not limited to frequency disturbances.
Recall from Section 3.1 that the power flows in power grids are
determined uniquely given supply and demand values. Therefore,
most of the time, the grid operator does not have any control over
the power flows from generators to loads. Once an adversary causes
a sudden increase in the loads all around the grid, assuming that
the frequency drop is not significant, the extra demand is satisfied
2Part of these controls can be done during the tertiary control. However, for simplicity
and without loss of generality we refer to them as the secondary control.
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automatically by generators through their primary controllers as
described in Section 3.3. Since the power flows are not controlled
by the grid operator at this stage, this change in supply and demand
may result in line overloads and consequent line-trippings [31].
If the primary controllers’ response results in line overloads,
assuming that these overloads can barely be tolerated for a short
period of time, these line overloads can be cleared during the sec-
ondary control. However, the system operator needs to ensure in
advance that possible line overloads can indeed be cleared during
the secondary control after any MAD attacks.
In this work, we focus on the effects of MAD attacks on the power
flow changes on the lines which are more challenging from system
planning perspective. Our objectives are: (i) to develop algorithms
for finding efficient operating points for the generators during the
economic dispatch such that no lines are overloaded after the primary
control response to any potential MAD attacks, and (ii) to design
methods to efficiently examine if line overloads after the primary
control–if any–can be cleared during the secondary control.
5 POWER FLOWS: PRIMARY CONTROL
In this section, we provide two algorithms for finding operating
points for the generators during the economic dispatch process
such that no lines are overloaded after automatic response of the
primary controllers to any MAD attacks. We call such operating
points, robust operating points.
5.1 Power Flow Changes
In this subsection, we present couple of examples in order to demon-
strate complexity of power flow analysis after the primary con-
troller’s response to a MAD attack.
First, as can be seen in Fig. 3 the relationship between the power
flow changes on the lines and the demand changes are not intuitive.
For example, flow on line {2, 3} is maximizedwhen only the demand
at node 3 increases (Fig. 3(c)), whereas when demands at both nodes
1 and 3 increase, flow on line {2, 3} increases less (Fig. 3(d)).
Another important factor affecting the amount of power flow
changes on the lines, is amount of spinning reserve at each genera-
tor. For example, as can be seen in Fig. 4, an increase in the demand
at node 1 by 3 units may result in power flow decrease on line {2, 3},
if all the generators have enough spinning reserves (Fig. 4(a)). The
same scenario, however, results in power flow increase on line {2, 3},
if only generators 2 and 4 have spinning reserves (Fig. 4(b)).
Fig. 5 presents the relationship between power flow changes on
lines {2, 3} and {5, 3} versus power demand increase at node 1 dur-
ing two different spinning reserve availability scenarios in the grid
shown in Fig. 3(a). As can be seen in Fig. 5(a), if all generators have
enough spinning reserve the power flows change monotonically
with the demand change. However, as can be seen in Fig. 5(b), lim-
ited spinning reserve at generator 5 results in nonlinear relationship
between the power flows and the demand change.
Following the examples provided in this subsection, it is clear
that power flow changes on the lines after a MAD attack highly
depend on the initial operating point of the grid and is a nonlinear
problem in most cases. Despite the difficulties, however, in the next
two subsections we provide efficient algorithms for finding efficient
and robust operating points for the generators.
5.2 SAFE Algorithm
In order to avoid line overloads after the primary control response
to a potential MAD attack, the grid operator needs to compute
the maximum possible power flow changes on the lines following
an attack (based on ∆pdl values) and enforce the power flows on
the lines in OPF to be below their capacity minus the maximum
possible changes. As shown in previous subsection, however, the
maximum power flow changes on the lines depend on the operating
point of the generators and their spinning reserve. Therefore, one
cannot compute the maximum power flow changes on the lines
independent of the operating points to be used in the OPF problem.
One way to circumvent this problem, is to enforce all the gen-
erators to have enough spinning reserves to keep the relationship
between the power flow changes and demand changes linear (as in
Fig. 5(a)), and use this linear relationship to compute the maximum
power flow changes on the lines based on the operating point of
the generators. These values can then be added to the OPF problem
without making the problem nonlinear and nonconvex.
For each load i , define ®vi = [vi1,vi2, . . . ,vin ]T to denote the
primary controllers’ response to a unit demand increase at load i . If
all generators have enough spinning reserve, each generator j will
increase its generation byvi j := (1/Rj )/(∑nl=1 1/Rl ) to compensate
for a unit demand increase at node i (as described in Section 3.3).
Hence, by defining ®wi := ®vi − ®ei (recall from Section 3 that ®ei is the
ith fundamental basis of Rn ) one can compute the change in flow
of line e = (i, j) solely in terms of changes in the demands (∆pdi s):
∆fi j = 1/xi j (A+i − A+j )
n∑
l=1
∆pdl ®wl . (7)
Recall that −∆pdl ≤ ∆pdl ≤ ∆pdl based on the grid operator’s
estimation of the adversary’s power. Hence, the maximum flow
change on line (i, j) can be computed using (7) as:
∆f maxi j = 1/xi j
n∑
l=1
∆pdl |(A+i − A+j ) ®wl |, (8)
since for each l , ∆pdl can be selected by the adversary to be equal to
−∆pdl , if (A+i −A+j )T ®wl < 0, and equal to ∆pdl , if (A+i −A+j ) ®wl ≥ 0.
Now, to ensure that no lines are overloaded after a MAD attack,
all the system operator needs to do is to replace the capacity of
each line (i, j) in the OPF problem by fi j − ∆f maxi j . The only other
constraint that needs to be added to the OPF problem is tomake sure
that each generator i with 0 < 1/Ri has enough spinning reserve
to increase its generation according to its governor droop. For this,
define S∆pd :=
∑n
l=1 ∆pdl . Hence, each generator’s operating point
should be within following limits:
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : pдi + 1/Ri∑n
l=1 1/Rl
S∆pd ≤ pдi ≤ pдi −
1/Ri∑n
l=1 1/Rl
S∆pd .
(9)
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Figure 3: An example demonstrating that increasing all demandsmay not necessarily result in themaximumflow on the lines.
(a-b) Initial setting and power flows, (c) power flows if demand at bus 3 increases, and (d) power flows if demand at both buses
1 and 3 increases. All generators have the same droop characteristic and they all have enough spinning reserve.
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Figure 4: Dependency of power flow changes on the location
of the spinning reserves. (a) If all generators have spinning
reserves, demand increase at bus 1 results in power flow de-
crease on line {2, 3}. (b) If only generators 2 and 4 have spin-
ning reserves then demand increase at bus 1 results power
flow increase on line {2, 3}.
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Figure 5: Power flows on lines {5, 3} and {2, 3} in the grid
shown in Fig. 3(a) as demand at bus 1 increases. (a) If all the
generators have enough spinning reserve, and (b) if genera-
tor 5 has only 1 unit of spinning reserve.
Therefore, the robust OPF problem can be written as follows:
min
®θ, ®f , ®pд
n∑
l=1
cl (pдl ), (10)
s.t. (1), (2), (3), (8), (9),
| fi j | ≤ fi j − ∆f maxi j , ∀(i, j) ∈ E
®p = ®pд − ®pd .
We call the algorithm for finding a robust operating point for
generators based on solving (10), the Securing Additional margin
For generators in Economic dispatch (SAFE) Algorithm. Since this
algorithm limits the operating points of the generators, it is obvious
that it may not obtain the minimum cost robust operating points
for the generators. In the next subsection, we provide an algorithm,
albeit computationally more expensive, for finding robust operating
points for the generators without limiting their generation.
5.3 IMMUNE Algorithm
In (7), we assumed that none of the generators reach their maxi-
mum/minimum capacity as they increase/decrease their generation
according to their droop characteristics. However, by allowing some
generators to reach their maximum/minimum capacity, one may
find robust operating points for the generators with a lower cost.
In this subsection, we assume without loss of generality that
the total demand change S∆pd :=
∑d
i=1 ∆pdi is positive. Hence, we
focus mainly on generators’ maximum capacity. However, same
results hold for the case that S∆pd < 0 as well.
Once a generator reaches its maximum capacity, it cannot in-
crease its generation anymore, and therefore other generators
should generate more to compensate for the extra demand. The
following lemma provides the amount each generator generates
based on its spinning reserve and governor droop characteristic to
compensate for the extra demand after a MAD attack.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose generators are ordered such that if i < j,
Ri (pдi − pдi ) ≤ Rj (pдj − pдj ). Define ti := Ri (pдi − pдi ) and Si :=∑i
l=1 tl /Rl +
∑n
l=i+1 ti/Rl . If Si < S∆pd ≤ Si+1, to compensate for
the extra demand, generators 1 to i reach their maximum capacity and
each generator j > i generates 1/Rj∑n
l=i+1 1/Rl
(
S∆pd −
∑i
l=1(pдl − pдl )
)
.
In general, as demonstrated in Figs. 4 and 5, due to power gener-
ation limits, power flow on a line may not change monotonically as
demand changes in a specific node–as in (7). Hence, the maximum
change in the power flows cannot be found in a closed form as
in (8). However, one may be able to find an upper bound on the
maximum power flow change on a line.
Upper bounds on the maximum power flow changes after a MAD
attack can be computed by assuming the worst case initial operating
points and also assuming that generators can be arbitrarily assigned
to provide extra required generation. In particular, an upper bound
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∆̂fi j for the power flow changes on line (i, j) can be computed as:
∆̂fi j := max
®pд, ®∆pd , ®∆pд
1/xi j (A+i − A+j )( ®∆pд − ®∆pd ) (11)
s.t. ®1T ( ®pд − ®pd ) = 0,
®1T ( ®∆pд − ®∆pd ) = 0,
− ∆pdl ≤ ∆pdl ≤ ∆pdl , 1 ≤ l ≤ n
pд ≤ ®pд ≤ pд ,
0 ≤ ∆pдl ≤ pдl − pдl , 1 ≤ l ≤ n,
S∆pd ≥ 0.
Optimization (11) is a Linear Program (LP) that can be solved
efficiently for each line (i, j). Using these upper bounds, the solution
to the following OPF problem provides robust operating points for
the generators:
min
®θ, ®f , ®pд
n∑
l=1
cl (pдl ), (12)
s.t. (1), (2), (3), (5),
| fi j | ≤ fi j − ∆̂fi j , ∀(i, j) ∈ E
®p = ®pд − ®pd .
It is obvious that enforcing the power flows on all the lines, such
as (i, j), to be less than fi j − ∆̂fi j in the OPF problem as in (12)
ensures that none of the lines will be overloaded after a potential
MAD attack. However, the solution to (12) may not provide the
optimal robust operating points for the generators. To achieve a
better solution, we introduce an iterative algorithm that solves the
OPF problem and updates the line capacities to ensure robustness.
We will then use the upper bounds ∆̂fi j s to prove that the algorithm
will converge to a local optimal solution.
First, given the operating pointspд1, . . . ,pдn to the OPF problem,
the maximum power flow change on line (i, j) (denoted by ∆f maxi j )
can be computed by solving the following optimization problem:
∆f maxi j = max®∆pd
sgn(fi j )
(
1/xi j
n∑
l=1
−∆pdl (a+il − a+jl ) (13)
+ 1/xi j
n∑
l=1
fl (S∆pd )(a+il − a+jl )
)
s.t. − ∆pdl ≤ ∆pdl ≤ ∆pdl , 1 ≤ l ≤ n
S∆pd ≥ 0.
in which fl (.)s denote piecewise linear functions that determine the
extra output of the generators based on the total demand change
S∆pd . Since we assumed that pд1, . . . ,pдn are given, functions fl (.)
can be uniquely determined using Lemma 5.1. Notice that sgn(fi j )
in the objective of (13) is to ensure that the maximum changes are
in the direction of increase in the power flow on line (i, j). Hence,
for all lines ∆f maxi j ≥ 0.
Lemma 5.2. Optimization (13) can be solved in polynomial time
for each (i, j) ∈ E.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that generators are
ordered such that t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tn as defined in Lemma 5.1. It
Algorithm 1: Iteratively MiniMize and boUNd Economic dis-
patch (IMMUNE)
Input: G
1: flag = 1
2: Define ci j := fi j for all (i, j) ∈ E
3: while flag do
4: Compute OPF problem (6) such that ∀(i, j) ∈ E : |fi j | ≤ ci j
5: if OPF is not feasible then
6: return none
7: Compute ∆f maxi j by solving (13) for all (i, j) ∈ E
8: flag = 0
9: for (i, j) ∈ E do
10: if fi j < |fi j | + ∆f maxi j then
11: ci j = fi j − ∆f maxi j
12: flag = 1
13: return pд1, pд2, . . . , pдn
is easy to see that by using Lemma 5.1 and defining S0 := 0, one
can solve (13) in different linear regions of fl (.)s by considering
additional conditions for S∆pd (for 0 ≤ z < n):
Sz ≤ S∆pd < Sz+1. (14)
Under condition (14), fl (.)s can be determined as follows:
fl (S∆pd ) =

pl − pl l ≤ z,
1/Rl
(
S∆pd −
∑z
w=1(pw−pw )
)∑n
w=z+1 1/Rw l > z.
(15)
Hence, all the fl (.) are either constant or linear functions in (13) and
therefore (13) can be solved efficiently using LP. Hence, by solving
(13) at most n times (once for every condition (14) for different z)
∆f maxi j can be found in polynomial time. □
After computing ∆f maxi j values, one can use them to verify if
any of the lines will be overloaded after an attack. If yes, then add
additional constraints to the OPF problem to ensure that those
lines will not be overloaded. The OPF problem can then be solved
with new additional constraints and the process continues until no
additional constraints are needed. We call this algorithm Iteratively
MiniMize and boUNd Economic dispatch (IMMUNE) Algorithm
(summarized in Algorithm 1).
Lemma 5.3. If (12) is feasible, then the IMMUNE Algorithm con-
verges to a local optimum solution.
Lemma 5.3 provides a sufficient condition such that the IMMUNE
Algorithm converges to a local optimum. However, even if (12) is not
feasible, the system operator can still run the IMMUNE Algorithm
to obtain a local optimum solution if the OPF problem remains
feasible at each iteration of the algorithm.
We can also provide an upper bound on the number of iterations
that IMMUNE algorithm requires to converge. For this reason, the
algorithm needs to change discrete changes to the capacities at
each iteration.
Lemma 5.4. If the IMMUNEAlgorithm changes ci j at each iteration
by a discrete amount such as ci j = max{⌊ fi j − ∆f maxi j ⌋, fi j − ∆̂fi j },
then it terminates in at most O(∑(i, j)∈E ⌈∆̂fi j ⌉) iterations.
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Figure 6: Complexity of secondary controller problem. (a)
Secondary controller problem setting, (b) an attack thatmax-
imizes the demand, and (c) an attack that minimizes the de-
mand at one node and maximizes the demand at another
node.
Following a similar idea, one can increase the running time of
the IMMUNE algorithm by applying more aggressive update rules
for the capacities in line 11 of the algorithm. For example, line 11
can be replaced by ci j = 0.9(fi j −∆f maxi j ) or ci j = 0.95(fi j −∆f maxi j ).
We call these variations of the IMMUNE Algorithm, IMMUNE-0.9
and IMMUNE-0.95. In Section 8.2, we numerically evaluate and
compare the performance of these algorithms and demonstrate that
more aggressive update rules result in faster convergence.
One favorable property of the IMMUNE Algorithm is that it can
be easily parallelized. This parallelization can be used to simultane-
ously compute ∆f maxi j for all the lines at each iteration in order to
expedite the algorithm.
If the OPF problem becomes infeasible in any iteration of the
IMMUNE Algorithm, there are two ways to circumvent the issue:
(i) By considering higher temporary limits for the lines (e.g., 1.1fi j )
which is a common practice in power systems operation, but the
operator needs to ensure that line overloads can be cleared during
the secondary control, or (ii) by returning to the unit commitment
problem and change the list of committed generators to make sure
(12) is feasible. We will address the first approach in the next section
in detail. However, the second approach is beyond the scope of this
paper and is part of our future work.
6 POWER FLOWS: SECONDARY CONTROL
In cases that primary control cannot prevent line overloads, the
system operator have to clear these overloads during the secondary
control instead. In such cases, the operator needs to make sure
in advance that after the primary control’s response to a MAD
attack, there are operating points for the generators such that the
demand can be supplied with no line overloads (i.e., secondary
controller can clear the overloads). Assuming that the maximum
and minimum reachable demand at node i by an adversary is pdi
and pdi , respectively, this problem can be defined as the secondary
controller problem:
Secondary controller problem: For anypd1,pd2, . . . ,pdn that ∀1 ≤
i ≤ n : pdi ≤ pdi ≤ pdi , are there operating points pд1, . . . ,pдn
for the generators such that ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : pдi ≤ pдi ≤ pдi ,
®1T ( ®pд − ®pd ) = 0, and no lines are overloaded?
Definition 6.1. Agrid is called secondary controllable if the answer
to the secondary controller problem is yes.
Notice that operating cost of the generators are not important
during the secondary control, since the secondary controller activates
only after a potential attack and the operator needs to bring back
the grid to its normal state as soon as possible at any cost. Fig. 6
provides an example of the secondary controller problem. As can be
seen in Fig. 6(b), when the demands are all equal to their maximum
level after a MAD attack, the demand can be supplied by generators
with no line overloads. However, as presented in Fig. 6(c), when the
demand is increased to it maximum level at one node and decreased
to its minimum at another one, there is no possible way to supply
the demand such that no lines are overloaded. This example clearly
evinces that the secondary controller problem is not intuitive.
In the following subsections, we study the secondary controller
problem in detail and provide efficient algorithms to verify the
secondary controllability of a power system.
6.1 Maxmin Formulation
One way of verifying the secondary controllability of a power
system is by exploiting linear bilevel programs [3, 15]. The secondary
controller problem can be written in the form of a max-min linear
problemwhich is a special form of linear bilevel programs as follows:
max
®pd
min
®pд, ®q, ®f , ®θ
®1T ®q (16)
s.t. (1), (2), (3), (4), (5),
®p = ®pд − ®pd + ®q,
qi ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
pdi ≤ pdi ≤ pdi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In optimization problem (16), vector ®pd should be selected such that
for the best possible selection of vector ®pд and positive auxiliary
vector ®q, the objective value is maximized. Following proposition
relates the solution of (16) to the secondary controller problem.
Proposition 6.2. The optimal solution of (16) is 0 if, and only if,
the grid is secondary controllable.
Proof. If the optimal solution to (16) is 0, then for any demand
vector ®pd , vector of generation values ®pд can be selected such that
®1T ( ®pд − ®pd ) = 0 and no lines are overloaded. Hence, the grid is
secondary controllable. Now if the grid is secondary controllable,
then for all demand vectors ®pd , there exists a vector of generation
®pд such that ®1T ( ®pd − ®pd ) = 0 and no lines are overloaded. Hence,
the auxiliary vector ®q can be selected to be equal to 0 by the min-
imization part of (16) for any vector ®pd . Therefore, the optimal
solution to (16) would be 0. □
Proposition 6.2 clearly demonstrates that solving (16) can deter-
mine secondary controllability of a power system. Moreover, when
optimal solution of (16) is greater than 0, the nonzero entries of the
optimal vector ®q can reveal the minimum extra generation required
to ensure secondary controllability of the system.
Despite many advantages of formulation (16), the max-min linear
program is nonconvex [4] and proved to be NP-hard [20]. There-
fore existing efficient algorithms for solving (16) only obtain local
optimal solutions [3]. However, a local optimal solution of (16) with
value 0 does not guarantee the secondary controllability of the
system since the optimal solution may not be zero.
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One way of solving (16) optimally, albeit in exponential running
time, is through brute force search. Following lemma demonstrates
that to solve the secondary controller problem, one needs to check
only the extreme demand points due to convexity of the space of
all possible demand values and linearity of power flow equations.
Lemma 6.3. The grid is secondary controllable, if and only if for all
pd1, . . . ,pdn such that pdi ∈ {pdi ,pdi } there exist operating points
pд1, . . . ,pдn for the generators such that ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : pдi ≤ pдi ≤
pдi , ®1T ( ®pд − ®pd ) = 0, and no lines are overloaded.
One the other hand, for a given demand vector ®pd , it can be
verified in polynomial time whether there exist operating points
for the generators that satisfy the secondary controller problem by
solving the minimization part of (16) using LP:
min
®pд, ®q, ®f , ®θ
®1T ®q (17)
s.t. (1), (2), (3), (4), (5),
®p = ®pд − ®pd + ®q
qi ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
If the optimum solution to (17) is not 0, then the optimal vector ®q
can be used by the operator to make more generators online for con-
trollability of the grid. Hence by solving (17) for all extreme demand
vectors, one can verify secondary controllability of a system in ex-
ponential running time and also find how to make it controllable–if
it is not–based on obtained vectors ®q.
By focusing only on nodes with the largest demands, one can
approximately verify if for a subset of extreme points there exist
operating points for the generators satisfying the secondary con-
troller problem. In general, however, such approach may not be
able to guarantee the secondary controllability of a grid. Hence,
in the next subsection, we provide sufficient conditions to ensure
secondary controllability of a grid in polynomial time.
6.2 Predetermined Secondary Controllers
Despite the difficulty in exact determination of secondary con-
trollability of a grid, in this subsection, we introduce and exploit
suboptimal predetermined controllers to verify controllability of a
gridwith no false positives (i.e., presentedmethods cannot determine
uncontrollability of a system).
In order to verify secondary controllability of the grid, one can
find the best predetermined way to set the generation values given
a demand vector ®pd such that the maximum power flows over
all demand vectors is minimized. In particular, we define the ®β-
determined controller as follows.
Definition 6.4 ( ®β-determined controller). For any demand vector
®pd , set ®pд = (
∑n
i=1 pdi ) × ®β , for a vector ®β satisfying:
(i) ®β ≥ 0, (ii) ®1T ®β = 1, (iii) (∑ni=1 pdi ) × ®β ≤ pд ,
(iv) (∑ni=1 pdi ) × ®β ≥ pд .
Definition 6.5. A controller is called reliable, if for all feasible
demand vectors ®pd , it provides a vector of operating points for the
generators like ®pд such that | ®f | = |B( ®pд − ®pd )| ≤ f .
Proposition 6.6. If there exists a vector ®β such that the ®β-determined
controller is reliable, then the grid is secondary controllable.
For a vector ®β satisfying conditions (i-iv) in Definition 6.4, de-
fine vectors ®wi (β ) := −®ei + ®β for 1 ≤ i ≤ n (as in Section 5.2).
The following lemma proves that maximum flow on the lines over
all feasible demand vectors, given a ®β-determined controller, can
deterministically be computed.
Lemma 6.7. Given a ®β-determined controller, the maximum power
flow on each line ek over all possible demand vectors is:
max
pd ≤ ®pd ≤pd
| fk | =
 n∑
i=1
(pdi + pdi )
2 Bk ®wi
(β )
+ n∑
i=1
(pdi − pdi )
2 |Bk ®wi
(β ) |.
(18)
The main question is now whether there exists a vector ®β such
that the maximum power flows as determined in (18) are less than
their capacities? We prove that one can examine this efficiently and
in polynomial time by solving the following optimization:
min
η, ®β, ®f
η (19)
s.t. (i-iv) in Definition 6.4,
®f = |BW(β )(pd + pd )/2| + |BW(β ) |(pd − pd )/2,
®f ≤ η f ,
in which matrix W(β ) := [ ®w1(β ), . . . , ®wn (β )]. The following
proposition demonstrates that (19) can be solved using LP in poly-
nomial time. Moreover, it indicates that the optimal solution to
(19) can provide the best vector ®β for deterministically controlling
the grid and its optimal value demonstrates if the corresponding
®β-determined controller is reliable.
Proposition 6.8. Optimization (19) can be solved using LP. More-
over, if the optimal value η∗ to (19) is less than or equal to 1, then
the ®β∗-determined controller obtained from corresponding solution is
reliable, and therefore the grid is secondary controllable.
From (18), it can be seen that the formula for computing max-
imum flow on the lines consists of two separate sums which can
be controlled by different vectors and obtained a better controller.
Hence, one can define the (®γ , ®β)-determined controller as follows.
Definition 6.9 ((®γ , ®β)-determined controller). For any demand vec-
tor ®pd , set ®pд = (
∑n
i=1(pdi + pdi )/2) × ®γ + (
∑n
i=1(pdi − pdi/2 −
pdi/2)) × ®β , for vectors ®γ and ®β satisfying:
(i) ®β , ®γ ≥ 0, (ii) ®1T ®γ = ®1T ®β = 1,
(iii) (∑ni=1(pdi + pdi )/2) × ®γ + (∑ni=1(pdi − pdi )/2) × ®β ≤ pд ,
(iv) (∑ni=1(pdi + pdi )/2) × ®γ + (∑ni=1(−pdi + pdi )/2) × ®β ≥ pд .
The (®γ , ®β)-determined controller generalizes the ®β-determined
controller (just set ®γ = ®β) and it is easy to see that the maximum
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power flow on the lines over all demand vectors, given a (®γ , ®β)-
determined controller can be computed similar to (18) as follows:
max
pd ≤ ®pd ≤pd
| fk | =
 n∑
i=1
(pdi + pdi )
2 Bk ®wi
(γ )
+ n∑
i=1
(pdi − pdi )
2 |Bk ®wi
(β ) |.
(20)
Optimal (®γ , ®β)-determined controller can be found similar to the
optimal ®β-determined controller using an optimization similar to
(19) with a few small changes:
min
η, ®γ , ®β, ®f
η (21)
s.t. (i-iv) in Definition 6.9,
®f = |BW(γ )(pd + pd )/2| + |BW(β ) |(pd − pd )/2,
®f ≤ η f .
Again, as in the ®β-determined controller case, the optimal value
of (21) determines if the optimal (®γ , ®β)-determined controller is
reliable or not. Hence, the grid operator can use (21) to efficiently
determine the secondary controllability of the grid, albeit obtaining
false negatives in some cases.
In Section 8, we numerically evaluate the performance of the
controllers introduced in this section. Before that, however, we
demonstrate that these controllers can be used to efficiently provide
lower bounds on the scale of MAD attacks that a grid can tolerate.
7 αD-ROBUSTNESS
Power grids are required to withstand single equipment failures
(e.g., lines, generators, and transformers) with no interruptions in
their operation (a.k.a. N − 1 standard) [33]. Following N − 1 stan-
dard, we define a new standard for the grid operation to ensure
its robustness against MAD attacks. We call this αD standard that
requires grids to be robust against contingencies resulted by chang-
ing the demand by α fraction. We call a grid that is robust against
these type of contingencies, αD-robust.
The αD-robustness can be enforced during the economic dis-
patch using SAFE or IMMUNE algorithms developed in Section 5
so that no lines are overloaded after the primary control. In this sec-
tion, however, assuming that the power lines can handle temporary
overloads (as in the previous section), we are interested in finding
maximum α such that the grid is αD-robust after the secondary
control. We denote that value by αmax.
Since as we described in the previous section, verifying the sec-
ondary controllability of the grid for a given upper and lower limits
on the demands is hard, we cannot expect to find the αmax effi-
ciently. Hence, in the next two subsections, we develop efficient
methods for obtaining upper and lower bounds on αmax.
7.1 Upper Bound
Assume ®pd † denotes the vector of predicted demand values. For
a given α , the demand vector ®pd resulted by a MAD attack will
be bounded by (1 − α) ®pd † ≤ ®pd ≤ (1 + α) ®pd †. Now if a grid is
αD-robust, it should particularly be robust against the maximum
demand attack. Hence, finding the maximum α for which the grid
can handle the maximum demand attack provides an upper bound
for αmax. Such α can be found efficiently by a LP:
max
α, ®pd , ®pд, ®f , ®θ
α (22)
s.t. (1), (2), (3), (4), (5),
®pd = (1 + α)p†d ,
®p = ( ®pд − ®pd ).
Proposition 7.1. Assume αˆ denotes the optimal value of (22),
then αmax ≤ αˆ .
The optimal value of (22) provides a good upper bound for αmax
and can be computed efficiently. In the next subsection, we provide
algorithms to find lower bounds for α based on the controllers
developed in Section 6.2.
7.2 Lower Bound
To find a lower bound for αmax, we use the controllers in Section 6.2
to limit the secondary controller’s ability in changing the genera-
tors’ operating points. Limiting the secondary controller’s ability
allows us to efficiently approximate the maximum α , but because
of this limitation, we only obtain lower bounds for αmax.
First, assume that we limit the secondary controller to the ®β-
controller for a fixed ®β . We show that in this case the maximum
α can be found by solving a single LP. Assume ®pд∗ is the optimal
solution to (22) with value αˆ and set ®β = ®pд∗/∥ ®pд∗∥1 (i.e., controller
only scales down the generation compared to themaximum demand
case). Using (18), we show that the optimal value of the following
LP gives a lower bound for αmax:
max
α, ®f
α (23)
s.t. (1 + α)(
n∑
i=1
p†di ) × ®β ≤ pд ,
(1 − α)(
n∑
i=1
p†di ) × ®β ≥ pд ,
®β = ®pд∗/∥ ®pд∗∥1,
®f = |BW(β ) ®pd † | + |BW(β ) |(α ®pd †),
| fi j | ≤ fi j , ∀(i, j) ∈ E.
Proposition 7.2. The optimal solution α∗ of (23) can be found in
polynomial time using LP. Moreover, α∗ ≤ αmax.
Optimization (23) allows us to efficiently compute a lower bound
for αmax. However, similar to Section 6.2, instead of fixing ®β , we
can compute a ®β that results in the largest possible lower bound.
Due to nonlinearity of the problem, however, we cannot optimize
®β and found maximum α in (23) simultaneously. The idea is to fix
α , compute the optimal ®β and η using (19), then update α using
η and repeat the process until α does not change by much. As in
Section 6.2, we can use the (®γ , ®β)-determined controller instead of
the ®β-determined controller to improve the obtained lower bound.
The method is summarized in Module 1. When γ = β , Module 1
provides a lower bound on αmax like α (β ) based on ®β-determined
controllers.
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Module 1: Lower Bound on αmax using (®γ , ®β)-determined Con-
trollers
Input: G , λ
1: α (0) = αˆ
2: flag = 1
3: i = 0
4: while flag do
5: flag = 0
6: Compute the optimal value η, ®γ , and ®β of (21) for
pd = (1 + α (i )) ®pd † and pd = (1 − α (i )) ®pd †
7: Set α (i+1) = α (i ) + λ(1 − η)
8: if |α (i+1) − α (i ) | > 0.001 then
9: flag = 1
10: i = i + 1
11: return α (γ ,β ) := α (i ), ®γ , and ®β
Notice that λ in Module 1 should be set such that updates to α
at each iteration are neither too large that the module falls into a
loop, nor are too small that it takes a long time to converge.
Proposition 7.3. When γ = β , for a good λ, Module 1 converges
to a α (β ) value such that α (β ) ≤ αmax. Moreover, α∗ ≤ α (β ). (Recall
that α∗ is the optimal solution of (23).)
Proposition 7.4. For a good λ, Module 1 converges to a α (γ ,β )
value such that α (γ ,β ) ≤ αmax. Moreover, α (β ) ≤ α (γ ,β ).
In the next section, we numerically compare the upper bound
αˆ , and lower bounds α∗, α (β ), and α (γ ,β ) with αmax in order to
demonstrate the tightness of these bounds in approximating αmax.
8 NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first numerically evaluate the performance of
SAFE and IMMUNE Algorithms developed in Section 5. Then, we
numerically evaluate the accuracy of the upper and lower bounds
developed in Section 7 in approximating the maximum α such that
the grid is αD-robust (i.e., αmax).
8.1 Simulations Setup
For solving LP, we use CVX, a package for specifying and solving
convex programs [18, 19]. For computing the optimal power flow
part of the IMMUNE Algorithm, we use MATPOWER [35] which
is a MATLAB based library for computing the power flows. We
also exploit the power system test cases available with this library
for our simulations. In particular, we use IEEE 14-bus, 30-bus, and
57-bus test systems, and the New England 39-bus system.
The line capacities are only provided for the IEEE 30-bus and
New England 39-bus systems. Hence, for the other two systems,
we set the capacities ourselves in two-different ways: (i) following
[8] for each line we set fi = max{1.2| f †i |,median(| ®f † |)}, and (ii)
set fi = 1.1max(| ®f † |), in which ®f † are the power flows given the
default supply and demand values in the test systems. When the
first method is used for determining the capacities, it is indicated
by (f) in front of the grid name, and when the second method is
used, it is indicated by (u) (e.g., see Table 3).
Table 1: Performance Evaluation of SAFE and IMMUNE Al-
gorithms on New England 39-bus system. Cost values are in
$/hr . Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of itera-
tions took the IMMUNE Algorithm to converge.
α OPF SAFE IMMUNE IMMUNE-0.95 IMMUNE-0.9
0.09 41264 - 43434 (7) 43805 (4) 43859 (3)
0.08 41264 43628 42394 (8) 42431 (3) 42982 (3)
0.07 41264 42665 41773 (5) 41991 (3) 42405 (3)
0.06 41264 42050 41492 (4) 41698 (3) 41534 (2)
0.05 41264 41668 41339 (10) 41421 (3) 41419 (2)
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Figure 7: Percentage increase in operating cost of the grid
in order to make it robust against MAD attacks obtained by
SAFE and IMMUNEAlgorithms versus themagnitude of the
attack (α ) in New England 39-bus system.
8.2 Primary Control
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of SAFE and IM-
MUNE Algorithms on NEW England 39-bus and IEEE 30-bus sys-
tems. We assume that (1 − α)p†di ≤ pdi ≤ (1 + α)p
†
di and consider
different α values to capture attacks with different magnitudes
(which depends on the number of controlled bots by an adversary).
Table 1 compares the performance of SAFE and three variations
of the IMMUNE Algorithm for different α values. Recall from Sec-
tion 5.2 that IMMUNE-0.95 and IMMUNE-0.9 are similar to the
IMMUNE Algorithm but apply more aggressive updates on the
capacities in each iteration of the algorithm. This, as mentioned in
Section 5.2 and demonstrated numerically here in Table 1, results
in faster convergence of the algorithm. Since the OPF problem does
not consider robustness of the grid against MAD attacks, its value
is independent of the magnitude of an expected attack (α ).
As can be seen in Table 1 and as we expected, the grid needs
to be operated in a non-optimal operating point in order to be
robust against MAD attacks. The required percentage increase in
the operating cost of the grid obtained by the SAFE and IMMUNE
Algorithms versus α are presented in Fig. 7. IMMUNE Algorithm
results in the least amount of increase in the operating cost. How-
ever, since as demonstrated in Table 1, IMMUNE Algorithm takes
longer that IMMUNE-0.95 and IMMUNE-0.9 Algorithms to con-
verge, the system operator may prefer to use IMMUNE-0.95 which
performs approximately as well as the IMMUNE Algorithm but
converges faster. Notice that due to nonconvexity of the problem, a
more aggressive update rule may not necessary result in a costlier
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Table 2: Performance Evaluation of SAFE and IMMUNE Al-
gorithms on IEEE 30-bus system. Cost values are in $/hr .
Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of iterations
took the algorithm to converge.
α OPF SAFE IMMUNE
0.31 565.2 - - (3)
0.3 565.2 614.8 - (4)
0.28 565.2 571.6 569.6 (3)
0.26 565.2 565.32 565.22 (2)
0.22 565.2 565.2 565.2 (1)
operating point, as we see here that IMMUNE-0.9 results in a lower
operating cost than IMMUNE-0.95 for α = 0.06.
It can also be seen that SAFE Algorithm performs relatively well
in finding a robust operating point of the grid much faster than
all variations of IMMUNE Algorithm (recall from Section 5.3 that
SAFE Algorithm requires only to solve a single LP). However, it
may become infeasible for higher magnitude attacks (in this case
for α = 0.09).
We repeated the simulations in IEEE 30-bus system. The results
are presented in Table 2. First, it can be seen that the IEEE 30-bus
system can be protected against much stronger attacks (α = 0.3)
which demonstrates that different grids may have different levels of
robustness againstMAD attacks (wewill make a similar observation
in the secondary control case in the next subsection). Unlike the
New England 39-bus case, here the IMMUNE Algorithm does not
converge for the strongest attack (α = 0.3) rather than the SAFE
Algorithm. This demonstrates that each of these algorithms may be
useful in finding a robust operating point for the grid in different
scenarios–besides their running time and optimality.
As can be seen in Table 2, in this case also, if the IMMUNE
Algorithm converges, it converges to a lower cost operating point
than the one obtained by the SAFE Algorithm. Here, the IMMUNE
Algorithm converged within few iterations. Therefore, there were
no need to consider faster variation of the IMMUNE Algorithm as
in the New England 39-bus case.
Finally, it can be seen that for α = 0.31, none of the algorithms
can obtain a robust operating point for the grid.We show in the next
subsection that this case can be handled by the secondary controller
instead (assuming that lines can handle temporary overloads).
8.3 Secondary Control
In order to evaluate the performance of the controllers developed
in Section 6.2, in this subsection, we focus on their performance in
approximating αmax as described in Section 7.
Table 3 compares the maximum α obtained by different methods
in several test cases. As can be seen and proved in Section 7, in all
cases, α∗ ≤ α (β ) ≤ α (γ ,β ) ≤ αmax ≤ αˆ . Notice that for the IEEE
57-bus system, since the brute force search algorithm needs to solve
(17) about 242 times for each given α to determine the secondary
controllability of the grid, we could not exactly determine αmax.
However, in the case of IEEE 57-bus (f), after initial iterations of
the brute force search algorithm, we could determine that the grid
is not secondary controllable for 0.09 ≤ α as presented in the table.
It can be seen that αˆ provides a very close upper bound for αmax
most of the time (except in IEEE 57-bus (f)). And since it can be
Table 3: Lower and upper bounds for αmax.
Test case α∗ α (β ) α (γ ,β ) αmax αˆ
IEEE 14-bus (f) 0.058 0.1649 0.1906 0.2117 0.2117
IEEE 14-bus (u) 0.950 1.0243 1.1454 1.1479 1.1479
IEEE 30-bus 0.214 0.2851 0.3126 0.37 0.3717
NE 39-bus 0.039 0.0796 0.0962 0.0962 0.0962
IEEE 57-bus (f) 0.024 0.0307 0.0311 < 0.09 0.2
IEEE 57-bus (u) 0.128 0.2396 0.2864 - 0.3468
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Figure 8: Number of iterations in Module 1 before it con-
verges versus its update step size λ in IEEE 30-bus system.
computed by a single LP, the numerical results suggest that it is an
efficient and reliable way to find an upper bound for αmax. On the
other hand, α∗ that can also be computed efficiently by a single LP,
does not provide a very close lower bound in the test systems that
we studied here. However, α (β ) and α (γ ,β ) that require more time
to be computed, provide much better lower bounds. In particular, in
the case of New England 39-bus system α (γ ,β ) = αˆ which implies
that αmax = α (γ ,β ) = αˆ .
Although finding α (β ) and α (γ ,β ) requires solving an LP in sev-
eral iterations (as summarized inModule 1), the number of iterations
can be minimized by selecting a good step size λ. For example, the
number of iterations of Module 1 versus λ is presented in Fig. 8 in
the IEEE 30-bus system. As can be seen, for the optimal λ (in this
case λ = 1.1), the module converges in 3 iterations. Hence, it can
find a good lower bound for α , as shown in Table 3, very efficiently
and in polynomial time (since it solves a single LP at each iteration).
A good λ can be found in practice heuristically after the first few
iterations and observing the rate of changes.
Finally, as mentioned in Section 6, the secondary controllability
becomes more important when the primary controller cannot pre-
vent line overloads, but the overloads can be tolerated for a short
period of time. An example of such scenario happens in IEEE 30-bus
system and when α = 0.31. As can be seen in Table 2, none of the
SAFE and IMMUNE Algorithms can find a robust operating point
for the grid in this case. However, as can be seen in Table 3, since
this value is less that αmax = 0.37, any line overloads can be cleared
by the secondary controller.
9 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyzed the effect of MAD attacks on power
flows in detail and presented SAFE and IMMUNE algorithms for
finding robust operating points for the generators during economic
dispatch such that no lines are overloaded after automatic primary
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control response to any MAD attacks. Moreover, we demonstrated
that in cases that temporary overloads can be tolerated, the system
operator can approximately but efficiently verify in advance that
potential line overloads can be cleared during the secondary control
after any MAD attacks. Based on that, we defined αD-robustness
notion and demonstrated that upper and lower bounds on the maxi-
mum α for which the grid is αD-robust can be found efficiently and
in polynomial time. We finally evaluated the performance of the
developed algorithms and methods, and showed that they perform
very well in practical test cases.
We believe that with universality and growth in the number of
high-wattage IoT devices and smart thermostats, the probability of
MAD attacks is increasing and there is an urgent need for more stud-
ies on the potential effects of these attacks and developing tools for
grid protection. Our work provides the first methods for protecting
the grid against potential line failures caused by newly discovered
MAD attacks. However, our work can be extended in several di-
rections. A straight forward direction is to extend the developed
results to the AC power flow model. A more challenging research
direction is to extend the methods to unit commitment phase of the
grid operation. Since regular unit commitment problem is already
a combinatorial problem, incorporating security constraints into
that problem will be a challenging task and part of our future work.
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A OMITTED PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 5.1. First, notice that 1/Ri is the rate with
which generator i increases its generation to compensate for the
extra demand. Hence, ti denotes the time that generator i reaches
its maximum capacity if the total supply does not meet the demand
before ti . Accordingly, generators reach their maximum capacity
in order of their ti values from smallest to largest. Using this, it
is easy to see that Si is the total change in generation at time ti .
Therefore, if Si < S∆pd , then generators 1 to i will reach their max-
imum capacities before supply meets the total demand. Moreover,
since S∆pd ≤ Si+1, generators i + 1, . . . ,n do not reach their capac-
ities and each contribute according to their droop characteristic to
compensate for the remaining S∆pd −
∑i
l=1(pдl − pдl ). □
Proof of Lemma 5.3. First, notice that for each line (i, j) ∈ E
and in each iteration of the IMMUNE Algorithm, ci j is not increas-
ing. To see this, assume ci j changes in the lth iteration, and coldi j and
cnewi j denote the value of ci j before and after the change, respectively.
Since ci j is changed, it means that fi j < | fi j |+∆f maxi j . On the other
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hand, | fi j | ≤ coldi j . Hence, fi j < coldi j +∆f maxi j or fi j −∆f maxi j < coldi j .
Since cnewi j = fi j − ∆f maxi j , therefore cnewi j < coldi j .
On the other hand, from (11), it is easy to verify that after each
iteration fi j − ∆̂fi j ≤ ci j . Hence, ci j s cannot get smaller than the
fixed values fi j − ∆̂fi j and since (12) is feasible, the OPF problem
remains feasible after each iteration of the IMMUNE algorithm.
Now since ci j s are non-increasing and limited by lower bounds,
the algorithm is guaranteed to remain feasible and converge to a
local optimum solution. □
Proof of Lemma 5.4. In each iteration of the IMMUNE algo-
rithm, at least for a single line (i, j), the ci j will be updated. Other-
wise the algorithm should terminate (either converges or become
infeasible). On the other hand, since ∆̂fi j is the maximum possible
flow change on line (i, j), the ci j cannot get smaller than fi j − ∆̂fi j .
Hence, since the updates are discrete, in the worst case that only a
single capacity is updated by a single unit at each iteration, the algo-
rithm can take at most
∑
(i, j)∈E ⌈∆̂fi j ⌉ iterations to terminate. □
Proof of Lemma 6.3. Assume ®pd (1), ®pd (2), . . . , ®pd (2
n ) denote all
possible extreme demand vectors. Now assume that for each ex-
treme demand vector ®pd (i), there exists a operating vector ®pд (i) for
generators that satisfies the secondary control conditions. We prove
that for all demand vectors ®pd within the upper and lower limits also
there exists an operating vector ®pд that satisfies all the secondary
controller conditions. Since the space of all the demand vectors is
convex, each demand vector ®pd within the upper and lower limits
can be written as a convex combination of the extreme points such
as ®pd =
∑2n
i=1 βi ®pd (i) in which ∀i : βi ≥ 0 and
∑2n
i=1 βi = 1. We
show that ®pд = ∑2ni=1 βi ®pд (i) satisfies all the secondary controller
conditions. First, since ®pд is a convex combination of ®pд (i)s and
they are within generators upper and lower limits, so is ®pд . Sec-
ond, it is easy to see that ®1T ( ®pд − ®pd ) =
∑2n
i=1 βi ®1T ( ®pд (i) − ®pd (i)) =∑2n
i=1 βi0 = 0. Finally, based on our assumptions, for each i: −f ≤
B( ®pд (i)− ®pd (i)) ≤ f . Hence, B( ®pд − ®pd ) =
∑2n
i=1 βiB( ®pд (i)− ®pd (i)) ≤∑2n
i=1 βi f = f . Similarly, −f ≤ B( ®pд − ®pd ). Therefore, ®pд satisfies
all the constraints of the secondary controller problem. The reverse
can also be similarly proved using contradiction method. □
Proof of Proposition 6.6. If there exists a vector ®β that the
®β-determined controller is reliable, then for any feasible demand
vector ®pd , vector of operating points ®pд = (
∑n
i=1 pdi ) × ®β satisfies
the demands (i.e., ®1T ( ®pд − ®pd ) = 0) and | ®f | = |B( ®pд − ®pd )| ≤ f .
Therefore, the grid is secondary controllable. □
Proof of Lemma 6.7. From definition of ®wi (β ) vectors, it is easy
to verify that for a demand vector ®pd , the power flow on line ek
can be computed as fk =
∑n
i=1 pdiBk ®wi (β ). For | fk | to be max-
imized, each pid should be either equal to pdi or pdi based on
signs of Bk ®wi (β ) and fk . On the other hand, it is easy to see that
pdi =
(pdi+pdi )
2 −
(pdi−pdi )
2 and pdi =
(pdi+pdi )
2 +
(pdi−pdi )
2 . So by
considering only pdi ∈ {pdi ,pdi }, fk can be computed as follows:
fk =
n∑
i=1
pdiBk ®wi (β ) =
n∑
i=1
( (pdi + pdi )
2 ±
(pdi − pdi )
2
)
Bk ®wi (β )
=
n∑
i=1
(pdi + pdi )
2 Bk ®wi
(β )
+
n∑
i=1
( ± (pdi − pdi )2 )Bk ®wi (β ).
From equation above, it can be seen that the first part is fixed but
the second part can be selected based on sign of the first part in
order to maximize | fk |. Hence, it is easy to see that maximum value
of | fk | is:
max
pd ≤ ®pd ≤pd
| fk | =
 n∑
i=1
(pdi + pdi )
2 Bk ®wi
(γ )
 + n∑
i=1
(pdi − pdi )
2 |Bk ®wi
(β ) |.
□
Proof of Proposition 6.8. In order to solve (19) using LP, one
can define auxiliary vector ®u and matrix Q and replace the con-
straint ®f = |BW(β )(pd + pd )/2| + |BW(β ) |(pd − pd )/2 in (19) with
following set of inequalities:
®f = ®u + Q(pd − pd )/2,
®u ≥ BW(β )(pd + pd )/2,
®u ≥ −BW(β )(pd + pd )/2,
Q ≥ BW(β ), Q ≥ −BW(β ),
in which the matrix inequalities are entry by entry. Now it is easy
to verify that since the optimization minimize η and ®f ≤ η f , in the
optimal solution ®f will be minimized and therefore ®u and Q will
be equal to |BW(β )(pd + pd )/2| and |BW(β ) |, respectively. Hence
using above transformation, (19) can be solved using LP. It can be
seen that if the optimal solution η∗ to (19) is less than or equal to
1, then since ®f is equal to the maximum power flow on the lines
over all possible demand vectors (and corresponding generation
operating points obtained by the ®β∗-determined controller) and
®f ≤ η∗ f ≤ f , the ®β∗-controller is reliable. Hence, the grid is
secondary controllable. □
Proof of Proposition 7.1. Since in optimization (22) only the
maximum demand case (i.e., ®pd = (1 + α) ®pd †) is being verified to
be satisfiable by the generators with no line overloads, the optimal
solution of (22) only provides an upper bound for αmax. □
Proof of Proposition 7.2. Using (18), it can be verified that the
maximum power flow on a line (i, j) over all the demand vectors and
corresponding generation vector determined by the ®β-determined
controller is equal to |BW(β ) ®pd † | + |BW(β ) |(α ®pd †). Hence, opti-
mization (23) maximizes α such that the grid is αD-robust using the
specified ®β-determined controller. On the other hand, since the op-
erating points of the generators are limited to the operating points
obtained by the specified ®β-determined controller, it is obvious that
demand vectors that are controllable by this controller are subset
of all controllable vectors. Hence, α∗ only provides a lower bound
for αmax. Finally, it is also easy to see that similar to the technique
presented in the proof of Proposition 6.8, optimization (23) can be
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solved using LP and therefore α∗ can be computed in polynomial
time. □
Proof of Proposition 7.3. At each iteration, if α (i) > αmax,
then the solution η to (19) would be greater than 1. Hence, if λ is
small enough, 0 ≤ α (i+1) = α (i) + λ(1 − η) ≤ α (i). Similarly, it
can be shown that if α (i) < αmax, then α (i+1) > α (i). On the other
hand, for α (i) = αmax, the solution η to (19) would be zero and
α (i) = α (i+1) = αmax. Hence, αmax is the only absorbing point for
this algorithm which it converges to (if λ is small enough). □
Proof of Proposition 7.4. The convergence proof is similar
to the proof of Proposition 7.3. It is also easy to see that since
®β-determined controllers are special case of (®γ , ®β)-determined con-
trollers, α (β ) ≤ α (γ ,β ). □
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